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Can a domestic policy implemented by the government in the past help explain the puzzling 
practice of health care usage today? I study this question in the context of India, where households’ 
use of primary health care services presents a paradox. A significant fraction of Indian households 
uses fee-charging private health care services even though most providers have no formal medical 
qualifications. The private share of health care use is even higher in markets where qualified 
doctors offer free care through public clinics. Combining contemporary household-level data with 
archival records, I examine the aggressive family planning program implemented during the 
emergency rule in the 1970s and explore whether the coercion, disinformation, and carelessness 
involved in implementing the program could partly explain the puzzle. Exploiting the timing of 
the emergency rule, state-level variation in the number of sterilizations, and an instrumental 
variable approach, I show that the states heavily affected by the sterilization policy have a lower 
level of public health care usage today. I demonstrate the mechanism for this practice by showing 
that the states heavily affected by forced sterilizations have a lower level of confidence in 
government hospitals and doctors and a higher level of confidence in private hospitals and doctors 
in providing good treatment. 
 
JEL Codes: I11, N35, I12, J13 








The past decades have seen substantial efforts from national governments and international donor 
organizations to strengthen the public health care sector in low- and middle-income countries.1 
Despite these efforts, however, the private sector plays an important role in providing health care 
services, and a significant fraction of households in these countries still visit fee-charging private 
health care facilities.2 
In India, for which extensive data is available, households’ use of primary health care 
services presents a puzzle.3 The puzzle is as follows. First, a significant fraction of households uses 
fee-charging private health care services, which are not covered by insurance (CPR 2011; IIPS 
2017; Peters et al. 2002).4 Second, major portions of private health care providers have no formal 
medical qualifications (Rohde and Viswanathan 1995; Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004). 5 
Although public health care providers are more qualified and offer free services, they have only 
around 20% of the market share (Muralidharan et al., n.d.).6 Third, while the absence of public 
health care facilities or personnel could partly explain the high use of the private sector, this cannot 
be the only explanation. The private share of health care use is higher even in markets where 
qualified doctors offer free care in public hospitals; despite this service, the majority of health care 
visits are made to providers with no formal medical qualifications (Das, Holla, et al. 2016). Fourth, 
 
1 This is particularly due to the efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) under Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
2 See, for example, Bennett et al. (2005), Grépin (2016), and Mackintosh et al. (2016) 
3 Henceforth, I refer to “primary health care” as the “health care” for simplicity. 
4 For example, India has one of the highest proportions of private health spending anywhere in the world, constituting 
82% of all health expenditure. Only five countries (Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, 
Myanmar, and Sierra Leone) have a higher dependence on private health financing (Peters et al. 2002). 
5 For example, according to the Indian Medical Association, about 1 million unqualified doctors practice allopathic 
medicine in India. https://www.ima-india.org/ima/left-side-bar.php?pid=291. Accessed on January 28, 2021. 
6  The Medical Advice, Quality, and Availability in Rural India (MAQARI) project. 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/161151429125257286/pdf/13-Medical-Advice-Quality-and-Availability-in-Rural-
India-MAQARI-Karthik-Muralidharan.pdf. Accessed on January 28, 2021. 
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within India, there is a considerable variation in the types of health care usage across states (Peters 
et al. 2002; Muralidharan et al., n.d.). Why does such a paradoxical situation exist? 
 In this study, I examine a plausible reason for the existence of such a paradox. I question 
whether the current practice of health care use in India has historical routes. In particular, I study 
whether a domestic policy implemented by the government in the past explains the existence of 
such a paradox. Combining contemporary household-level data with archival records, I examine 
the aggressive family planning program implemented during the emergency rule in the 1970s and 
explore whether the coercion, disinformation, and carelessness involved in implementing the 
program could partly explain the puzzle. 
 Between June 1975 and January 1977, India experienced a brief period of autocratic rule.7 
This period, popularly known as “the emergency,” which was proclaimed by then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi under the Indian constitution, suspended a wide range of civil liberties. A unique 
policy that affected a majority of population was the introduction of an aggressive family planning 
program through forced sterilization.8 The policy—implemented in April 1976—led to a sharp 
increase in the number of sterilizations (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). About 8.3 million 
sterilizations were performed in a single year between April 1976 and March 1977, more than three 
times the previous year’s figure. Historical records, court rulings, and anecdotal evidence suggest 
that these sterilization targets were accomplished through incentives and disincentives, coercion, 
disinformation, carelessness, and fear (Shah Commission of Inquiry 1978; Panandiker, Bishnoi, 
and Sharma 1978). 
 
7 The autocratic rule (the emergency) officially ended in March 1977. However, it was substantially relaxed in January 
1977. 
8  Henceforth, I refer to “the aggressive family planning program through forced sterilization” as the “forced 
sterilization policy” or “the policy” for simplicity. 
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 I hypothesize that the forced sterilization policy may have had unintended effects on future 
health care usage in India. There are reasons to believe that the policy could have unintended 
consequences. First, all sterilizations, mostly administered through coercion and disincentives, 
were performed by government doctors in public hospitals or temporary sterilization camps 
established by the government. Due to increased pressure, targets to meet, and carelessness, no 
aftercare was administered, which sometimes led to serious side effects, including death. 
According to the report published by the Indian Government, 1,778 complaints of deaths related 
to sterilization were registered. Second, false information was delivered by public health care 
workers to motivate individuals to be sterilized. In a survey of four Indian states (Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Punjab, and  Uttar Pradesh) during the forced sterilization period, Panandiker, Bishnoi, 
and Sharma (1978) summarize the types of disinformation provided to motivate sterilization 
acceptors: 
What was often told was that sterilization, vasectomy or tubectomy, is a simple, quick and 
safe operation which stops child birth permanently. […] To the more circumspect of the 
prospective clients, it was also quietly added that in case of need for a child-birth later it 
could be reversed also. Nobody explained how an operation is performed, in what manner 
it stops the conception and what its consequences are to the health of a person. […] As the 
program was generally time and target bound, their mission was “Quick Catch” rather 
than to carry conviction. (p. 104) 
Considering these insights, I examine the consequences of the forced sterilization policy on India’s 
future health care practice. 
 To test my hypothesis, I use data from India’s national representative National Family and 
Health Survey in 2015–16 (NFHS-4) to examine the sources of households’ health care use. To 
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measure the exposure to the forced sterilization policy, I digitize and use various state-level 
sterilization performance statistics from the historical yearbooks published by the Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning, Government of India. I find that higher exposure to the forced 
sterilization policy is associated with lower use of public health care facilities today. My results 
are robust to a variety of controls and a number of alternative measures of exposure to the forced 
sterilization policy. 
 After establishing that the forced sterilization policy has a negative association with the 
use of public health care facilities today, I turn to the task of addressing concerns of reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To identify the 
causal impact, I need an instrument that exogenously determines the sterilization performance 
during this period. For this, I exploit the unique history of the implementation of the forced 
sterilization policy and use distance from New Delhi to state capitals as an instrument. This 
instrument is developed by and empirically tested in Sur (2021) to examine the impact of the forced 
sterilization policy on lower vaccination rate in India. 
The instrument is constructed considering the well know insight from the emergency 
period that the forced sterilization policy was aggressively undertaken owing to the active role 
played by Sanjay Gandhi, the son of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Gwatkin 1979; Indian 
National Congress 2011; Nayar 2013; Chandra 2017). Due to Mr. Gandhi’s personal influence, 
forced sterilization was aggressively undertaken in the northern parts of India, and distance from 
New Delhi, which was previously irrelevant, emerged as an important determinant of excess 
sterilizations and is itself capable of explaining two-thirds of the variation in sterilization 
performance among the states (Gwatkin 1979). Based on these insights, I use distance from New 
Delhi to state capitals as an instrument to capture the variation in exposure to the forced 
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sterilization policy. The unique history of the implementation of forced sterilization during the 
emergency period provides a basis for the exogeneity of my instrument. In addition, I perform two 
falsification tests to empirically show the exogeneity of this instrument. 
 The IV regression produces estimates that are similar to the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. I find that an average increase in excess sterilizations (from zero to about 3.2 times) 
decreases the use of public health care facilities today by about 18.6 percentage points. This is 
relative to a sample mean of 44.2% for our sample (public health care use) as a whole. It suggests 
that the forced sterilization policy has had a large, negative, and significant effect on the use of 
public health care facilities in India. 
 Finally, I examine the plausible channels through which the forced sterilization policy 
affects the use of public health care facilities. To explore the mechanisms, I first examine the 
reasons why households do not use public health care facilities. I use the data from NFHS-4 that 
asks an additional question of households who do not use public health care facilities, asking them 
to explain the reasons. I find that the effects of exposure to the forced sterilization policy on 
standard supply-side constraints—such as no nearby facility, facility timing not convenient, health 
personnel often absent, and waiting time too long—are minimal, sometimes negative, and 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that supply-side factors are less likely to be the mechanism 
for higher usage of private health care facilities. However, higher exposure to the forced 
sterilization policy has a positive and significant effect on households answering “poor quality of 
care” and “other” as their reasons for not using public health care facilities. 
 Next, I delve further into the reasons why households respond with “poor quality of care” 
and “other” as their reasons for not using public health care facilities. Note that, during the forced 
sterilization period, public health care workers did not provide appropriate medical care and often 
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delivered false information to motivate individuals to undergo sterilization. I therefore check 
whether loss of confidence is a direct plausible channel. I use data from the Indian Human 
Development Survey-II in 2011–12 (IHDS-II) on confidence in institutions to examine how 
exposure to forced sterilization policy affects confidence in hospitals and doctors. The IHDS-II 
asks households separate questions on confidence in government hospitals and doctors and private 
hospitals and doctors to provide good treatment. I find that households belonging to states that 
were highly exposed to the forced sterilization policy exhibit a lower level of confidence in 
government hospitals and doctors and exhibit a higher level of confidence in private hospitals and 
doctors in providing good treatment. The results imply that a lower level of confidence or distrust 
of government hospitals and doctors is a plausible mechanism for lower usage of public health 
care facilities. 
 In addition to the historical literature discussed previously, this paper builds on and 
contributes to a diverse range of literature. First, I contribute to the rich literature on understanding 
of the puzzling factors associated with India’s health care usage. Several studies have documented 
that supply-side determinants are contributing factors for lower usage of public health care 
facilities in India (Peters et al. 2002; Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004; De Costa and Diwan 2007; 
Das, Holla, et al. 2016).9 Furthermore, owing to higher usage of private health care facilities in 
India, there have been recent initiatives to train unqualified private health care practitioners to 
achieve better health care delivery (Government of Telangana 2015; Das, Chowdhury et al. 2016). 
However, little causal evidence exists on why people use private health care facilities in the first 
place, especially in markets with a qualified doctor offering free care in a public hospital. Similarly, 
we know little about the causal pathways through which individual or social characteristics 
 
9 Supply side factors include lower public health care spending, Lack of nearby health care facility, absence of 
health care personnel, and lower quality of public health care. 
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influence households’ decisions to use health care services. I build on and contribute to this 
literature in three ways. First, I provide an empirical investigation of the importance of historical 
events in shaping India’s current health care usage. Second, I offer causal evidence that historical 
characteristics—domestic policies implemented in the past—influence current decision-making 
for households’ health care usage. Third, I provide a plausible mechanism for this puzzling practice 
today. 
 Health care provision is a public good, and universal health coverage is considered to be 
an integral part of the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 3, Target 3.8). To achieve universal 
health care coverage in low- and middle-income countries, international organizations such as the 
World Bank advocate delivering health care through free or nominally priced medical care in 
publicly run facilities staffed by qualified doctors (World Bank 2003). However, a significant 
fraction of households in these countries still visits fee-charging private health care providers 
(Bennett et al. 2005; Grépin 2016; Mackintosh et al. 2016). Furthermore, households in low- and 
middle-income countries spend a substantial portion of their resources on health care (World Bank 
Group 2019).10 This paper builds on and contributes to the literature on understanding a potential 
reason for this practice. I present evidence suggesting that health intervention through government 
policies in the past could have a long-term and persistent effect on explaining such health care-
seeking behavior at present. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background 
of the emergency period and the forced sterilization policy. Section 3 explains the historical and 
contemporary data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the OLS and IV results. 
Section 5 discusses the mechanisms, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
10 For a detailed overview of the health care market, health care utilization, and access to health care in developing 
countries, see Dupas (2011), Das and Hammer (2014), and Dupas and Miguel (2017). 
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2. Context: Emergency Rule and Forced Sterilizations in India 
In this section, I provide a brief background of the emergency rule period and forced sterilization 
policy in India. For a detailed overview of the emergency period, please see Nayar (2013) and 
Dhar (2018). Furthermore, for a detailed overview of the sterilization program during the 
emergency rule period, please see Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma (1978), Shah Commission of 
Inquiry (1978), and Gwatkin (1979). 
 On June 25, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a national emergency under 
Article 352 of the Indian constitution.11 The exact reason for the declaration of emergency rule is 
controversial to this day. However, sociologists, political scientists, and historians agree that 
economic and political difficulties concerning her leadership and India are the most credible 
factors. 
 The emergency rule allowed Ms. Gandhi to suspend a wide range of civil liberties under 
the Indian constitution. Thousands of people, including key opposition leaders, were arrested, the 
press was censored, and public gatherings and strikes were declared illegal. With all the power in 
Ms. Gandhi’s hands, she undertook a series of constitutional amendments and introduced new 
legislations to govern the country. The executive power of the emergency allowed the central 
government to give directions to states as to the manner in which the executive power was to be 
exercised. However, on January 23, 1977, Ms. Gandhi unexpectedly called for an election in March 
of that year. She released the opposition leaders from jail, lifted press censorship, and permitted 
 
11 Article 352 (1) states that “If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India 
or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, 
by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory 
thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation Explanation. A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security 
of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by armed rebellion may 
be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied that 
there is imminent danger thereof.” 
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public meetings once again. The emergency period officially ended in March after the Indian 
National Congress Party’s defeat in the Lok Sabha election (the lower house of the Indian 
parliament). 
 A distinctive feature of the emergency period was an aggressive family planning program 
achieved through sterilization. It commenced in April 1976, about a year after the proclamation of 
the emergency. The aggressive family planning program started with the New Population Policy 
(NPP) introduced to the parliament by the Ministry of Health and Family Planning.12 The NPP 
mainly concentrated on propagating sterilization as its method of family planning. Temporary 
sterilization camps were established by the government. With the NPP’s introduction, the central 
government authorized and endorsed a series of coercive measures for sterilization and, in extreme 
cases, the provision for compulsory sterilization. The central and state governments substantially 
increased the financial rewards for sterilization acceptors. Through a range of incentives and 
disincentives, they pressured their employees to get sterilized and to motivate others to do so. In 
some cases, quotas were imposed at the district level. Additionally, state and central government 
employees were given quotas to produce people for sterilization. In other cases, citizens were 
required to produce sterilization certificates to access basic facilities, such as public health care, 
irrigation, and subsidized food through ration cards (Shah Commission of Inquiry 1978; 
Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma 1978). 
 The aggressive nature of the family planning program and the concentration of effort on 
propagating sterilization resulted in about 8.3 million sterilizations between April 1976 and March 
1977, more than three times the number in the previous year. During the peak, over 1.7 million 
sterilizations were performed in September 1976 alone, a figure that equaled the annual average 
 
12 For a detail overview of the NPP, see Singh (1976). 
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for the ten preceding years (Gwatkin 1979). The majority of the sterilizations, about 75%, involved 
men undergoing vasectomies. 
 Historical records, court rulings, and previous studies suggest that incentives and 
disincentives were provided, sterilization quotas were imposed, and coercion was applied to 
motivate individuals to undergo sterilization during this period.13 For example, in Uttar Pradesh, a 
motivation bonus—of 6 rupees (about 0.7 US dollars) per person motivated to undergo 
sterilization—was provided to the full-time family planning staff for each person sterilized in 
excess of their quota. Additionally, as a form of disincentive, over 24,000 employees of the 
Department of Health and Family Planning were not paid their salaries in June 1976 for their 
failure to complete their quotas for the April–June quarter (Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma 1978). 
Some extreme rules were also made. In a letter from the Chief Secretary of Bihar (the most senior 
position in the civil services of the states in India), Divisional Commissioners were informed of 
the following decision: 
Non-achievement of targets would render officers and staff of Health Department liable to 
punishment e.g., censure in case of achievement short of cent (100) per cent, stoppage of 
increment with cumulative effect if achievement was less than 75 per cent and termination 
of service if achievement fell short of 50 per cent. (Shah Commission on Inquiry 1978 p. 
172) 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals were influenced and misinformed to lead 
them to accept sterilization during the forced sterilization period. In a survey of four Indian states 
during this period, Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma (1978) found that about 72 percent of the 
 
13 For a detailed discussion on quota enforcement, incentives and disincentives, coercion, and fear around sterilization 
during the emergency, see Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma (1978) and Shah Commission of Inquiry (1978). 
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sterilized people were motivated by the influence of government officials and more than 58 percent 
were influenced by family planning (health care) staff. 14  Only about 19 percent undertook 
sterilization on their own initiative, and the remaining 9 percent were motivated by friends and 
relatives. None of those surveyed underwent sterilization because of the lure of money and no one 
cited any case where money had played a motivating part. They noted the following environment 
in which most individuals were sterilized: 
The common sites for the (sterilization) camps in the rural areas were big villages, 
locations where village festivals and fairs were held, including weekly markets, and 
sometimes the primary health centers themselves. In the towns the camps were generally 
held near the crowded localities inhabited by the lower middle and poor class people. 
Preparations for the camps were made well in advance. Mobile units of medical staff were 
deputed to perform the operations. Family planning field staff would go round the 
neighboring villages or localities usually in government vehicles to exhort and “persuade” 
people to come forward for sterilization. Revenue officials, block staff, and school teachers 
were also often pressed into service for mobilizing people for operation at the camps and 
generally free transport—trucks, pick-ups, etc.—were provided to carry people to camp-
sites. At the camps, the assembled people were given refreshments, usually tea and snacks, 
before operation, and care was taken that nobody slipped away. Where camps were held 
jointly or separately for tubectomy, women patients were kept in improvised wards for 4 
or 5 days and, besides free dressing and medicine, were given free meals. Every acceptor, 
whether of vasectomy or tubectomy, was also given a cash award at the time of his or her 
discharge from the camp. (Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma 1978, pp. 108–111). 
 
14 The four Indian states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh. 
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 The aggressive nature of the program led to serious consequences, including medical 
complications, death, and sterilization of ineligible individuals. Once a person was sterilized and 
allowed to go home, he or she was generally forgotten and left to fend for himself or herself if any 
complications arose. Due to increased pressure, targets to meet, and carelessness, no aftercare was 
administered, which sometimes led to serious side effects, including death. According to the report 
published by the Indian Government, 1,778 complaints of deaths related to sterilization were 
registered. In several instances, ineligible individuals were sterilized as well. For example, reports 
of about 548 sterilization of unmarried individuals had been registered during this period. Similarly, 
in Uttar Pradesh, 11,434 individuals with fewer than two children and 69 persons over 55 years 
were sterilized (Shah Commission of Inquiry 1978). 
 This was the first major program since independence in which the people were pitted 
against the government. Every action of the government under the sterilization program was 
regarded as suspect and created a credibility gap in the government’s relationship with the people. 
The levels of coercion, disinformation, and carelessness associated with sterilization during this 
period gave free scope for the spread of rumors and fears. As a result, many people tried to avoid 
being caught by the sterilization programs. Whenever a sterilization campaign was launched or a 
camp held, a warning was spread through word of mouth to distant places and among a large 
number of people “Nasbandi-wale aarahe hein, Hoshiya rahena, Bhai” (The sterilization 
operators are coming. Beware) (Panandiker, Bishnoi, and Sharma 1978). 
 The legacy of the forced sterilization remained in peoples’ minds and was evident even 
after the emergency rule ended. For example, the sterilization program became the biggest political 
issue and played an important role in the subsequent elections in March 1977 and the defeat of 
Indira Gandhi’s Indian National Congress Party. To repair its poor reputation, the Indian 
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Government changed the name of the Department of Family Planning to the Department of Family 
Welfare. In the post-emergency period, the family planning program shifted from vasectomy to 
tubectomy, with women becoming the primary target (Basu 1985). The word “emergency” itself 
became synonymous with “sterilization” and, even today, individuals refer to the emergency period 
as the sterilization period (Tarlo 2000). The emergency rule remains controversial and is 
considered to be one of the darkest periods in the history of Indian democracy. 
3. Data Sources and Description 
My database constitutes historical data, two recent national representative household survey data 
(NFHS-4 and IHDS-II), and other contemporary but more aggregated data on population and 
health care facilities. 
3.1. Historical Data  
The historical data on sterilization for this paper come from the historical yearbooks published by 
the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, Department of Family Planning, Government of India. 
The yearbooks report yearly statistics on family planning programs performed between April and 
March every year along with various demographic and health statistics. Notably, the historical 
yearbooks include the number of sterilizations performed and the types of sterilization performed 
at the state level. 
 I digitized and use the sterilization data from the historical yearbooks published by the 
Ministry of Health and Family Planning. Figure A1 presents the total number of sterilizations along 
with the types of sterilization performed in India every year since the start of the program in 1956. 
As the figure shows, there is a sharp increase in the total number of sterilizations performed during 
1976–77. It is also evident that most sterilizations performed during this period were vasectomies. 
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 Figure 1 presents the total number of sterilizations performed between April 1976 and 
March 1977 at the state level. To provide a visual representation, I group the sterilization measures 
into several broad categories, with darker shades denoting a greater number of sterilizations 
performed. As shown, there is a considerable variation in the exposure to the forced sterilization 
policy at the state level. As I explain in detail in my IV analysis, a key determinant for this variation 
was because of the unique history of this period and the important role played by Sanjay Gandhi, 
the son of the prime minister.  
3.2. Household Survey Data  
I combine the historical data on exposure to the forced sterilization policy with two nationally 
representative household survey datasets from India—the National Family and Health Survey in 
2015–16 (NFHS-4) and the Indian Human Development Survey-II in 2011–12 (IHDS-II). The 
NFHS-4 is a stratified two-stage sample that covers all Indian states and union territories. The 
IHDS-II surveys cover all states and union territories of India, with the exception of the Andaman 
and Nicobar Island and Lakshadweep. 
 My primary outcome variable is the data on households’ sources of health care from the 
NFHS-4. The NFHS-4 asks households about the source of health care that they generally use 
when household members become sick.15 It categorizes health care sources into four broad groups: 
the public health sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or trust hospitals/clinics, the 
private health sector, and others. I construct an indicator variable measuring whether the household 
members generally use the public health sector. In the NFHS-4 sample, about 45% of households 
report using public health care facilities.16 In Figure 2, I present the average number of households 
 
15 The question the NFHS-4 asks is “When members of your household get sick, where do they generally go for 
treatment?”. 
16 This number is weighted by sample weights. The unweighted figure is about 47%. 
 16 
who generally use public health care facilities at the state level. As we can see, there is a wide 
variation in the use of public health care facilities at the state level. This is consistent with the 
findings of Peters et al. (2002) and Muralidharan et al. (n.d.), who found that there is a large 
variation in the types of health care usage across states. 
 I use additional data to examine the mechanism through which the forced sterilization 
policy influences decision-making concerning health care utilization. My first additional outcome 
variables to explore this mechanism are the responses in the NFHS-4 concerning reasons why 
households do not use public health care facilities. Respondents are allowed to provide multiple 
answers to this question in the survey. It reports a total of six reasons: no nearby facility, facility 
timing not convenient, health personnel often absent, waiting time too long, poor quality of care, 
and other reasons. I consider each possible reason separately as my outcome of interest to 
understand the factors that affect a household’s intention to avoid using public health care facilities. 
 My second additional outcome variable to explore the mechanism is the data on confidence 
in institutions from the Indian Human Development Survey-II in 2011–12 (IHDS-II). The IHDS-
II asks households questions on their confidence in hospitals and doctors to provide good treatment. 
It asks separate questions concerning government hospitals and doctors and private hospitals and 
doctors. The respondents can choose between three possible answers: a great deal of confidence, 
only some confidence, and hardly any confidence at all. The IHDS-II assigns the value 1 to “a 
great deal of confidence,” 2 to “only some confidence,” and 3 to “hardly any confidence at all.” 
Therefore, a higher score constitutes a lower level of confidence. 
3.3. Other Data 
 Finally, I use aggregate data on population and health care facilities and personnel to 
control for potential covariates that could affect both the exposure to forced sterilization and 
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current health care utilization. I collect population data from the 2011 population census to 
construct state-level population densities. Additionally, I collect health care facility and health care 
personnel data from Rural Health Statistics to construct information on hospitals and on doctors 
per 1,000 people at the state level. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Correlation Analysis and OLS Estimates 
I begin by showing a simple relationship between historical exposure to the forced sterilization 
policy and India’s current health care use through a scatter plot. Figure 3 presents the correlation 
between the total number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 (expressed in 100,000s of 
individuals) and the percentage of households who generally use public health care facilities 
calculated from the NFHS-4 at the state level. In Figure A2 in the Appendix, I present the same 
correlation plot but scaling the symbols so that the sizes represent the population of the state (from 
the 2011 census) for a better visualization. As we can see, the sterilization performance in 1976–
77 is strongly associated with less use of public health care facilities. 
 Then, I examine this relationship by controlling for household, geographic, and health care 
characteristics that are potentially important determinants of a household’s health care utilization. 
My baseline estimating equation is: 
!!"# = α +βForced	Sterilization# + γ$X!"#% + γ&X"#' + γ(X#) +  ϵ!"#                (1), 
where h indexes households, c denotes NFHS-4 clusters, and s denotes states. The variable !*+,, 
denotes my outcome variable, which varies at the household level h. It is an indicator variable that 
measures whether the household usually uses public health care facilities. The variable 
789:;<	=>;9?@?AB>?8C, denotes one of our measures of exposure to the forced sterilization policy 
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in state s. I will discuss this variable in more detail below. X!"#% , X"#' , and X))  are vectors of 
household-level, NFHS-4 cluster-level, and state-level control variables, respectively. 
 The household-level control variables X!"#%  include age and sex of the household head, 
household size, nine religion fixed effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household 
head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, an indicator for whether the 
household has a below poverty line (BPL) card, and an indicator for whether any household 
member is covered by health insurance. These controls are intended to proxy for household income 
and wealth. X"#'  is a vector of NFHS-4 cluster-level covariates intended to capture the 
characteristics of the place where the household lives, such as altitude in meters, altitude squared, 
and an indicator of whether the cluster is urban. X)) is a vector of covariates meant to capture state-
level characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the use of public health care facilities. 
They include population density per square kilometer (in log form), hospitals per 1,000 people, 
and doctors per 1,000 people. ϵ!"# is a random error term, capturing all omitted factors, which I 
allow to be heteroscedastic and correlated across households; in practice, the standard errors I 
report are clustered at the state level. Because NFHS-4 is a stratified two-stage sample designed 
to produce indicators at the district, state, and national levels and separate estimates for urban and 
rural areas, undersampling and oversampling are observed in many places. To account for this 
issue, I conduct the regression analysis using weights defined in the NFHS-4. 
 I present the OLS estimates of equation (1) in Table 1. In column 1, I use the total number 
of sterilizations performed in a state in 1976–77 (expressed in 100,000 individuals) as my measure 
of the intensity of the forced sterilization policy. The estimated coefficient for 
789:;<	=>;9?@?AB>?8C, , b, is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with my 
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hypothesis that the forced sterilization has a negative effect on households’ usage of public health 
care facilities. 
 A possible concern with the above estimation is that the distribution of my explanatory 
variable—Total Sterilizations Performed in 1976–77 (in 100,000)—is right-skewed with a large 
number of observations taking on small values. We can see this from Figure A3, which plots the 
histogram of the number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 at the state level. To account for 
this issue, I estimate equation (1) using the natural log of the number of sterilizations performed 
in 1976–77 as my measure of the intensity of the forced sterilization policy. I present the estimates 
in column 2 of Table 1. The results are similar to column 1, as I find a significant negative 
correlation between this measure of forced sterilization and the usage of public health care facilities. 
 In columns 1 and 2, I use the total number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 to 
measure exposure to the forced sterilization policy. One potential limitation of this measure is that 
it does not account for the number of sterilizations that would have happened anyway in the 
absence of the NPP under which the forced sterilization policy was undertaken. Accounting for 
this difference is important because sterilization, as a family planning method, has been performed 
in India since the 1950s, as shown in Figure A1. In column 3, I account for this issue and use an 
alternative measure of the forced sterilization policy measured by excess sterilizations performed 
in 1976–77 over and above the 1975–76 numbers.17 Additionally, in column 4, I report estimates 
using the natural log of the excess number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77. As we see, the 
results are similar using these alternative sterilization measures. 
 Finally, I report the estimates considering a better measure of forced sterilization policy 
that collectively accounts for India’s emergency rule, the size of states, and the state-level historical 
 
17 Using alternative measures of excess sterilization performed in 1976–77, involving deducting the average of the 
last two years or three years, produces nearly identical results. 
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characteristics associated with sterilization performance. The estimates reported in columns 3 and 
4 use the absolute number of sterilizations to measure forced sterilization policy. Some 
shortcomings of these measures are that they a) do not account for the difference in the size of 
states and b) do not account for any state-level historical factors associated with the level of 
sterilization performance that I do not capture in the estimation. To account for these issues, in 
column 5, I report the estimates after normalizing the excess sterilizations performed using 







I normalized the previous year’s figures to account for the effect of emergency rule in India (as 
1975–76 was part of the emergency period) and isolate the impact of the forced sterilization policy 
from India’s emergency rule.18 This is because the emergency rule itself could affect the outcome 
in several ways, given that India was primarily governed by autocratic rule during this period, and 
that it involved numerous policy changes. The results remain robust to this alternative specification, 
as shown in column 5. 
 In Section B of the Appendix, I present a series of robustness and sensitivity checks. I 
briefly discuss them here. First, I verify whether my results are sensitive to the inclusion and 
exclusion of controls. To verify this, I report estimates that involve adding each set of controls 
sequentially for each of my measures of forced sterilization (Tables B1–B5). In addition, I check 
 




whether the results remain robust when considering excess vasectomies only as an alternative 
measure of 789:;<	=>;9?@?AB>?8C, (Table B6), given that vasectomies constituted the majority of 
sterilization operations (see Figure A1). My findings are robust to these alternative specifications 
and different measures of the forced sterilization policy. 
 For the remainder of the analysis, I use state-level excess sterilizations performed in 1976–
77 normalized by the 1975–76 sterilization figure as my baseline measure of exposure to the forced 
sterilization policy (the specification from column 5 of Table 1). This provides the best measure 
as it accounts for India’s emergency rule and is normalized by both size and state-level historical 
characteristics associated with sterilization performance. However, as I illustrate in Table 1, my 
results are not reliant on this choice of measure only. 
4.2. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
In Section 4.1, I found that the forced sterilization policy has a negative association with the use 
of public health care facilities today. In this section, I address concerns of reverse causality and 
omitted variable bias using an IV approach. To identify the causal impact, I need an instrument 
that exogenously determines the sterilization performance during this period. For this, I exploit the 
unique history of the implementation of the forced sterilization policy and use distance from New 
Delhi to state capitals as an instrument to capture the state-level variation in exposure to the excess 
sterilizations performed during the emergency rule in India. 
 The unique history of the implementation of the forced sterilization policy is as follows. 
As described by Gwatkin (1979), Nayar (2013), and Chandra (2017), among others, the aggressive 
manner in which the forced sterilization policy was conducted was due to the active role of Sanjay 
Gandhi, the younger son of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Although he had not been 
officially elected and held no official position, Sanjay Gandhi rapidly rose to power during the 
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emergency period. Family planning was a key element of his self-declared five-point program that 
became the central theme of his public addresses.19 Mr. Gandhi and some of his close colleagues 
in Delhi were at the center of the action and continuously influenced regional political leaders, 
particularly those in the states adjacent to the national capital of Delhi (Shah Commission of 
Inquiry 1978). Owing to his personal influence, sterilization was aggressively undertaken in the 
northern part of India, particularly in the states adjacent to New Delhi. As a result, distance from 
New Delhi, which was previously irrelevant, emerged as an important determinant of performance 
in the excess sterilization program and is itself capable of explaining two-thirds of the variation in 
performance among the states (Gwatkin 1979). This unique history of the implementation of the 
forced sterilization policy during the emergency period and the personal influence of Sanjay 
Gandhi provide a basis for the construction and the exogeneity of my instrument. 
 I report the IV estimates in Table 2, including each set of control variables sequentially 
across columns 1–4. Panel A reports the first-stage estimates for the instrument. The first-stage 
estimates show that distance from New Delhi to state capitals is negatively correlated with excess 
sterilizations performed during the emergency rule in India. This is consistent with the general 
narrative and Gwatkin’s (1979) observation. In panel B, I present the second-stage estimates. They 
suggest a negative and statistically significant effect of the forced sterilization policy on the current 
use of public health care facilities. In Section C of the Appendix, as a robustness check, I consider 
excess vasectomies only (Table C1). The estimates are robust to this alternative specification and 
similar to the results reported in Table 2. 
 Not only are the negative coefficient estimates of Table 2 statistically significant, but they 
are also economically meaningful. Column 4 of Table 2 indicates that an average increase in excess 
 
19 The other four programs were adult education, abolition of dowries, planting of trees, and eradication of the caste 
system. 
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sterilizations—where sterilizations increased by 3.2 times compared with the rates prior to the 
enforced sterilization policy—decreases the use of public health care facilities today by about 18.6 
percentage points. This is relative to a sample mean of 44.2% for our sample as a whole. It suggests 
that the forced sterilization policy has a sizable effect on the use of public health care facilities in 
India. 
Falsification Tests—My IV strategy rests on the assumption that the instrument I use—distance 
from New Delhi to the state capital— is exogenous and satisfies the exclusion restriction. I provide 
some qualitative evidence, including Gwatkin (1979), supporting that my instrument is driven by 
the personal influence of the son of the then prime minister and in particular, it is not correlated 
with sterilization performance previously. In this section, I perform two falsification tests to show 
the exogeneity of my instrument empirically. 
 My first falsification exercise consists of examining sterilization performance before 1976. 
Because Sanjay Gandhi had no personal influence over sterilization before 1976, my IV—if 
exogenous—should have no predictive power on sterilization performance before 1976. First, in 
panel A of Figure 4, I present the relationship between my instrument and excess sterilizations 
performed in 1975–76. The scatter plot suggests no association between distance from New Delhi 
to state capitals and excess sterilizations performed in 1975–76. I formally test this relationship by 
estimating a placebo IV analysis in column 1 of Table 3. As shown, distance from New Delhi to 
state capitals has no predictive power for excess sterilizations performed in 1975–76 in the first 
stage and health care facility use in the second stage. 
 I undertake a second falsification exercise using excess female sterilizations, or 
tubectomies, which were not the main focus of the forced sterilization period (Shah Commission 
of Inquiry 1978; Gwatkin 1979; Basu 1985). The forced sterilization program did not focus on 
 24 
female sterilization because tubectomies constitute major abdominal surgery and require longer 
hospitalization periods for recovery. Conversely, vasectomies are relatively quick to perform, and 
recipients can be discharged on the same day of the operation. During the emergency period, 
sterilization was mostly performed in temporary camps. The existing infrastructure struggled to 
cope with the large number of operations induced by the increased pressure and targets imposed, 
which was another reason why tubectomy was not the main focus during this period. 
 This history provides a falsification test for my instrument. I present the relationship 
between my instrument and excess tubectomies performed in 1976–77 in panel B of Figure 4. The 
scatter plot suggests no association between distance from New Delhi to state capitals and excess 
tubectomies performed in 1976–77. I formally test this relationship by estimating a placebo IV 
analysis in column 2 of Table 3. The estimate in column 2 suggests that my IV does not have 
predictive power for excess female sterilizations performed during the forced sterilization period 
in the first stage and health care use in the second stage. 
 These two falsification tests suggest that the instrument that I use in my estimation is 
plausibly exogenous. In Section D of the Appendix, I report estimates adding each set of controls 
sequentially for each falsification test (Tables D1–D2). As shown, the estimates are robust to these 
alternative specifications and similar to the results reported in Table 3. 
5. Mechanisms 
In the previous section, I found that the forced sterilization policy has had a negative and sizable 
effect on public health care use in India. In this section, I examine plausible channels or 
mechanisms that explain this negative effect. First, I explore the reasons provided by the 
households in the NFHS-4 questionnaire. Then, I examine confidence in health care facilities and 
doctors as a plausible direct mechanism. 
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5.1. Examining the Reasons Given in the NFHS-4 
The NFHS-4 asks households who do not use public health care facilities to explain the reasons 
why. It offers a total of six reasons: no nearby facility, facility timing not convenient, health 
personnel often absent, waiting time too long, poor quality of care, and other reasons. Respondents 
were allowed to select multiple answers. I consider each answer separately as outcomes of interest 
to understand whether the forced sterilization policy has had any effect on households selecting 
these answers as reasons for not visiting a public health care facility. 
 I present the results in Table 4. As shown, the effects of exposure to the forced sterilization 
policy on standard supply-side factors—such as no nearby facility, facility timing not convenient, 
health personnel often absent, and waiting time too long—are minimal, sometimes negative, and 
statistically insignificant. These estimates suggest that supply-side constraints are not the 
mechanism explaining why households do not use public health care facilities in areas where 
exposure to the sterilization policy was high. 
 However, column 5 suggests that higher exposure to the forced sterilization policy has a 
positive and significant effect on households selecting “poor quality of care” as their reason for 
not using public health care facilities. Finally, the estimates in column 6 suggest that households 
are more likely to answer “other” as their reasons for not using public health care facilities in states 
where sterilization exposure was higher. 
 In Section E of the Appendix, I present a series of robustness and sensitivity checks. I first 
verify whether my results are sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of controls (Table E1). 
Second, I check my results for robustness when considering excess vasectomies only (Table E2). 
As we can see, overall, the estimates are robust to these alternative specifications and similar to 
the results reported in Table 4. 
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5.2. Examining Confidence in Health Care Facilities and Doctors from IHDS-II Data 
In this section, I delve further into plausible reasons for households selecting “poor quality of care” 
and “other” as their reasons for not using public health care facilities. I check whether loss of 
confidence or distrust in public health care and public health care personnel is a plausible channel 
for the current pattern of health care use. Several studies have shown that health interventions in 
the past are associated with subsequent mistrust in medicine (Alsan and Wanamaker 2018; 
Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann 2021; Lowes and Montero 2021). 
 I test for this channel in this context because false information was delivered by public 
health care workers to motivate individuals to undergo sterilization during this period. As noted 
earlier, during the forced sterilization period, after being sterilized and discharged from the camp 
or hospital, patients were generally left to fend for themselves even if any complications arose, 
which led to serious side effects for some, including death. Therefore, I check whether loss of 
confidence or distrust is a plausible channel for the current avoidance of public health care. 
 I use data from the Indian Human Development Survey-II in 2011–12 (IHDS-II) on 
confidence in institutions to examine how exposure to the forced sterilization policy affects trust. 
The IHDS-II asks households separate questions on confidence in government hospitals and 
doctors and private hospitals and doctors to provide good treatment. The respondents can choose 
between three possible answers to which the IHDS-II assigns values of 1, 2, and 3, respectively: 
“a great deal of confidence”, “only some confidence”, and “hardly any confidence at all”. 
 Figure 5 presents the association through scatter plots to aid visual understanding. In panel 
(A), I plot the correlation between excess sterilizations in 1976–77 and confidence in government 
hospitals and doctors. In panel (B), I plot the correlation between excess sterilizations in 1976–77 
and confidence in private hospitals and doctors. We see a positive association in panel (A) and 
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negative association in panel (B). It suggests that households belonging to states highly exposed 
to the forced sterilization policy exhibit a lower level of confidence in government hospitals and 
doctors, and a higher level of confidence in private hospitals and doctors in providing good 
treatment. 
 Next, I examine this relationship through an IV regression in Table 5. In column 1 (2), I 
estimate the relationship between the forced sterilization policy and confidence in government 
(private) hospitals and doctors. The results are similar to the association found in Figure 5. The 
results imply that a lower level of confidence in or distrust towards government hospitals and 
doctors is a plausible mechanism for lower usage of public health care facilities. In Section F of 
the Appendix, I report a series of alternative analyses showing that the results are robust overall 
and similar to those reported in Table 5. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examined the importance of a domestic policy, implemented by the government in 
the past, in shaping current health care use in India. In particular, I examined whether the 
aggressive family planning program under which a forced sterilization policy was implemented 
during the period of emergency rule in the 1970s could partly explain the lower use of public health 
care facilities today. 
 Using data from the NFHS-4, I examined households’ source of health care. I found that 
greater exposure to the forced sterilization policy is associated with lower use of public health care 
facilities today. I also found that the results were robust to a variety of controls, a number of 
alternative measures of exposure to the forced sterilization policy, and when examining the impact 
through an IV approach. 
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 Next, I examined plausible mechanisms. First, I examined the reasons why households do 
not use public health care facilities. I found that the exposure to the forced sterilization policy did 
not have significant effects on standard supply-side constraints. However, higher exposure to the 
forced sterilization policy has had a large, positive, and significant effect on households answering 
that “poor quality of care” and “other” reasons were why they chose not to use public health care 
facilities. 
 I delved further into the reasons why households responded that “poor quality of care” or 
“other” reasons led them to avoid public health care facilities. Using data from the IHDS-II on 
confidence in institutions, I found that households belonging to states that were highly exposed to 
the forced sterilization policy exhibit a lower (higher) level of confidence in public (private) 
hospitals and doctors in providing good treatment. These results imply that a lower level of 
confidence in or distrust towards public hospitals and doctors is a plausible mechanism for lower 
usage of public health care facilities. This could be expected given that public health care staff 
provided disinformation to motivate individuals to accept sterilization and did not provide proper 
aftercare during the sterilization period which led to serious complications including death. 
 My results provide robust evidence suggesting that historical policies implemented by the 
government in the past have had a strong and persistent impact on shaping health-seeking behavior 
today. This has important implications for understanding the puzzling factors behind the higher 
demand for private and unqualified health care services, even in markets where public provider 
exist and offer free health care through qualified doctors. I also offer mechanisms for this puzzling 
practice and provide plausible reasons for these mechanisms to prevail and persists in the long run. 
Overall, they highlight the unintended consequences associated with medical interventions in the 
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past and the importance of understanding such contexts for the design and implementation of 
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Figure 1: Number of Sterilizations Performed in 1976-77 (in 100,000s) 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents the state-level variation in exposure to the forced sterilization policy as measured by the 












Figure 2: Households Who Use Public Health Care Facilities (in Percentages) 
 
 
Notes: Figure 2 presents the state-level variation in the usage of public health care facilities in India (expressed in 
percentages). Darker shades denote a higher share of public health care facility use. The dataset on public health care 
facility use is available at a more granular level (such as at the district and NFHS-4 cluster level). It is grouped at the 














Notes: Figure 3 presents the correlation plot of the state-level total number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 
(expressed in 100,000s) and the household’s usage of public health care facilities in India in 2015–16 (expressed in 






















Figure 4: Falsification Test of the Instrument 
 
 
Panel A: Association between distance from New Delhi to state capitals and excess sterilization in 
1975-76 (previous year) 
 
 
Panel B: Association between distance from New Delhi to state capitals and excess Tubectomy 
 
Notes: Figure 4 presents the exogeneity of the instrument. Panel A presents the correlation between state-level excess 
sterilizations performed in 1975–76 (previous year) and the distance from New Delhi to state capitals. Panel B presents 
the correlation between state-level excess Tubectomy performed in 1976–77 and the distance from New Delhi to state 
capitals. The fitted lines are weighted by the population of the state and union territory. 
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Figure 5: Correlation Plot: Confidence in Hospitals and Doctors 
 
 
Panel A: Association between excess sterilizations in 1976–77 on confidence in government 
hospitals and doctors 
 
 
Panel B: Association between excess sterilizations in 1976–77 on confidence in private hospitals 
and doctors 
 
Notes: Figure 5 presents the correlation plots of the mechanism. Panel A plots the correlation between excess 
sterilizations in 1976–77 and confidence in government hospitals and doctors. Panel B plots the correlation between 
excess sterilizations in 1976–77 and confidence in private hospitals and doctors. The fitted lines are weighted by the 
population of the state and union territory. 
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Table 1: OLS Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Total Sterilizations Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) 
-0.0370***     
 (0.0112)     
Total Sterilizations Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
 -0.0864***    
  (0.0232)    
Excess Sterilization Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) 
  -0.0401***   
   (0.0119)   
Excess Sterilization Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
   -0.111***  
    (0.0245)  
Excess Sterilization     -0.0367** 
     (0.0160) 
      
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 574,022 574,022 558,755 547,495 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.443 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 























Table 2: IV Estimates 
 Panel A: First Stage Estimates 
 Dependent variable: Excess Sterilization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Distance from New Delhi to State Capitals 
(in 100km) 
-0.229*** -0.249*** -0.245*** -0.238*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0588) (0.0581) (0.0556) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 3.150 3.177 3.177 3.177 
F Statistics of Excluded Instrument 14.42 17.88 17.80 18.27 
     
 Panel B: Second Stage Estimates  
Dependent variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Sterilization -0.0710*** -0.0561** -0.0568** -0.0586*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0198) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 



















Table 3: Test of Exogeneity of the Instrument 








 (1) (2) 
   
Distance from New Delhi to State 
Capitals (in 100km) 
-0.0116 0.0129 
 (0.0241) (0.0113) 
   
Household Controls YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES 
   
Observations 558,755 558,016 
Mean of dependent variable 1.415 0.748 
F Statistics of Excluded Instrument 0.23 1.31 
   
 Panel B: Second Stage Estimates  
Dependent variable: Source of 
Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) 
   
Excess Sterilization (1975-76) -1.207  
 (2.204)  







   
Household Controls YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES 
   
Observations 558,755 558,016 
Mean of dependent variable 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 
(NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a household. Household controls 
include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion 
fixed effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head 
fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, an indicator for 
whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an 
indicator for whether the household has a BPL card. The geographic 
controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of 
residence is urban. Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 
population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** 









Facility timing not 
convenient 
Health personnel often 
absent 
Waiting time too 
long 
Poor quality of 
care 
Other 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Excess Sterilization -0.00161 -0.0193* -0.00404 0.00663 0.0596*** 0.00805** 
 (0.00720) (0.0103) (0.00883) (0.00923) (0.0163) (0.00352) 
       
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.445 0.263 0.149 0.408 0.483 0.0440 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a household. Household controls include age and 
sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household 
wealth index fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the household has a BPL 
card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place 
of residence is urban. Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 


















 Confidence: Private 
hospitals and doctors 
 (1) (2) 
   
Excess Sterilization 0.0605*** -0.0325* 
 (0.0178) (0.0167) 
   
Household Controls YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES 
Observations 40,562 40,549 
Mean of dependent variable 1.577 1.308 
Notes: Data are from India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II), 2011-12. The Unit 
of observation is a household. The household controls include household size, income, ten 
source of main income fixed effects, eight religion fixed effects, five caste fixed effects, 
two wealth class fixed effects (poor, middle class, (comfortable as reference group)), 16 
education of the household head fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household 
member is covered by government health insurance, an indicator for whether any 
household member is covered by private health insurance, and an indicator for whether 
the household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include state level population 
density (in log) and three place of residence fixed effects. Health facility controls include 
hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust 
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Section A: Figures 
 
Figure A1: Number of Sterilizations Performed in India (1956-82) 
 
Notes: Figure A1 presents the total number of sterilizations along with the types of sterilization performed in India 
every year since the beginning of the program in 1956. The green line represents the total number of sterilizations 
performed every year. The blue and red lines represent the total number of vasectomies and tubectomies performed 




















Notes: Figure A2 presents the correlation plot of the state-level total number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 
(expressed in 100,000s) and the household’s usage of public health care facilities in India in 2015–16 (expressed in 
percentages). The symbols are scaled by the size of the population of the state (from the 2011 census). The fitted lines 





















Notes: Figure A3 plots the histogram of the number of sterilizations performed in 1976–77 (expressed in 100,000s) at 



















Section B: Robustness to OLS Estimates  
 
Table B1: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Total Sterilizations Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Total Sterilizations Performed in 1976-
77 (in 100,000) -0.0391*** -0.0450*** -0.0448*** -0.0370*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0100) (0.00966) (0.0112) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 601,509 575,319 574,022 574,022 
Mean of dependent variable 0.449 0.443 0.443 0.443 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 



















Table B2: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Total Sterilizations Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Total Sterilizations Performed in 1976-77 
(in log) -0.105*** -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.0864*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0240) (0.0247) (0.0232) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 601,509 575,319 574,022 574,022 
Mean of dependent variable 0.449 0.443 0.443 0.443 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 





















Table B3: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Excess Sterilization Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Sterilization Performed in 1976-
77 (in 100,000) -0.0393** -0.0458*** -0.0449*** -0.0401*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 





















Table B4: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Excess Sterilization Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Sterilization Performed in 1976-
77 (in log) -0.109*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0245) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 574,237 548,577 547,495 547,495 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.442 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 





















Table B5: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Excess Sterilization 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Sterilization -0.0321 -0.0316* -0.0330** -0.0367** 
 (0.0192) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0160) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 























Table B6: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Male Sterilization 
 
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Total Vasectomies Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) -0.0405*** 
    
 (0.0129)     
Total Vasectomies Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
 -0.0826***    
  (0.0237)    
Excess Vasectomies Performed in 
1976-77 (in 100,000) 
  -0.0391***   
   (0.0127)   
Excess Vasectomies Performed in 
1976-77 (in log) 
   -0.0978***  
 
   (0.0231)  
Excess Male Sterilization 
(Vasectomy) 
    -0.0143** 
     (0.00538) 
      
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 574,022 574,022 558,755 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.443 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 















Section C: Robustness to IV Estimates 
 
Table C1: Alternative Measures of Force Sterilization Policy - Vasectomy 
 
Panel A: First Stage Estimates  
Dependent variable: Excess Male Sterilization (Vasectomy)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)      
Distance from New Delhi to State 
Capitals (in 100km) -0.441** -0.527*** -0.510*** -0.490*** 
 (0.180) (0.174) (0.164) (0.167) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 6.913 6.984 6.985 6.985 
F Statistics of Excluded Instrument 5.98 9.18 9.63 8.62      
 
Panel B: Second Stage Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Male Sterilization (Vasectomy) -0.0369*** -0.0265** -0.0273** -0.0285*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.00905) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a 
household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, 
four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, 
an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the 
household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state 
level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls 
include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 











Section D: Robustness to Falsification Tests 
 
Table D1: Test of Exogeneity of the Instrument: Excess Sterilization (1975-76) 
 
Panel A: First Stage Estimates  
Dependent variable: Excess Sterilization (1975-76)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)      
Distance from New Delhi to State 
Capitals (in 100km) -0.00427 0.0164 0.0150 -0.0116 
 (0.0316) (0.0238) (0.0270) (0.0241) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 1.432 1.414 1.415 1.415 
F Statistics of Excluded Instrument 0.02 0.47 0.31 0.23      
 
Panel B: Second Stage Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Sterilization (1975-76) -3.809 0.851 0.928 -1.207 
 (27.47) (1.335) (1.724) (2.204) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 585,634 559,899 558,755 558,755 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is 
a household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed 
effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index 
fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator 
for whether the household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, 
altitude squared, state level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. 
Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. 










Table D2: Test of Exogeneity of the Instrument: Excess Female Sterilization (Tubectomy) 
 Panel A: First Stage Estimates 
 Dependent variable: Excess Female Sterilization (Tubectomy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Distance from New Delhi to State 
Capitals (in 100km) 0.00239 0.00731 0.00713 0.0129 
 (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0113) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 584,893 559,160 558,016 558,016 
Mean of dependent variable 0.743 0.748 0.748 0.748 
F Statistics of Excluded Instrument 0.03 0.28 0.29 1.31 
     
 Panel B: Second Stage Estimates  
Dependent variable: Source of Health Care - Public Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Excess Female Sterilization 
(Tubectomy) 6.791 1.908 1.954 1.077 
 (42.44) (4.123) (4.156) (1.150) 
     
Household Controls NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 584,893 559,160 558,016 558,016 
Mean of dependent variable 0.448 0.443 0.442 0.442 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is 
a household. Household controls include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed 
effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household wealth index 
fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator 
for whether the household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, 
altitude squared, state level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. 
Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. 












Section E: Robustness to Examining the Reasons in NFHS-4 
 
Table E1: Reasons for Household Generally do not Go to a Government Health Care Facility -
Sequential Inclusion of Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










of care Other 
       
Excess Sterilization 0.00919 -0.0274** -0.00656 0.000316 0.0614*** 0.0124* 
 (0.00864) (0.0127) (0.00961) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.00644) 
       
Household Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Geographic Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 282,333 282,333 282,333 282,333 282,333 282,333 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.446 0.264 0.148 0.409 0.479 0.0433 
       
Excess Sterilization -0.000364 -0.0228** -0.00555 0.00385 0.0546*** 0.0114** 
 (0.00688) (0.0106) (0.00863) (0.00924) (0.0134) (0.00532) 
       
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 274,936 274,936 274,936 274,936 274,936 274,936 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.445 0.263 0.149 0.408 0.483 0.0440 
       
Excess Sterilization -0.000959 -0.0231** -0.00580 0.00364 0.0529*** 0.0115** 
 (0.00626) (0.00968) (0.00718) (0.00865) (0.0142) (0.00501) 
       
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO 
       
Observations 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.445 0.263 0.149 0.408 0.483 0.0440 
       
Excess Sterilization -0.00161 -0.0193* -0.00404 0.00663 0.0596*** 0.00805** 
 (0.00720) (0.0103) (0.00883) (0.00923) (0.0163) (0.00352) 
       
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.445 0.263 0.149 0.408 0.483 0.0440 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a household. Household controls 
include age and sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head 
fixed effects, four household wealth index fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an 
indicator for whether the household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state level 
population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place of residence is urban. Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 population 
and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 57 
Table E2: Reasons for Household Generally do not Visit a Government Health Care Facility - Male Sterilization 
Dependent variable No nearby facility 
Facility timing not 
convenient 
Health personnel often 
absent 
Waiting time too 
long 
Poor quality of 
care Other 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Excess Male Sterilization 
(Vasectomy) -0.000813 -0.00973* -0.00204 0.00335 0.0301*** 0.00407** 
 (0.00372) (0.00576) (0.00458) (0.00491) (0.0112) (0.00183) 
       
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 274,693 
Mean of dependent variable 0.445 0.263 0.149 0.408 0.483 0.0440 
Notes: Data are from India's National Family and Health Survey 2015-16 (NFHS-4). The Unit of observation is a household. Household controls include age and 
sex of the household head, household size, nine religion fixed effects, four caste fixed effects, 21 education of the household head fixed effects, four household 
wealth index fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by health insurance, and an indicator for whether the household has a BPL 
card. The geographic controls include altitude of the cluster in meters, altitude squared, state level population density (in log) and an indicator whether the place 
of residence is urban. Health facility controls include hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust standard errors in 













Section F: Robustness to Confidence in Health Care Facilities and Doctors 
 
Table F1: Confidence in Institutions: Sequential Inclusion of Controls 
 
Dependent variable  Confidence: Government hospitals and doctors  Confidence: Private hospitals and doctors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Excess Sterilization 0.0365 0.0379* 0.0400* 0.0605*** -0.0376** -0.0317** -0.0320** -0.0325* 
 (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0233) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.0143) (0.0154) (0.0167) 
         
Household Controls NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Geographic Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Health Facility Controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Observations 41,854 40,562 40,562 40,562 41,841 40,549 40,549 40,549 
Mean of dependent variable 1.579 1.577 1.577 1.577 1.311 1.308 1.308 1.308 
Notes: Data are from India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II), 2011-12. The Unit of observation is a household. The household controls include household 
size, income, ten source of main income fixed effects, eight religion fixed effects, five caste fixed effects, two wealth class fixed effects (poor, middle class, 
(comfortable as reference group)), 16 education of the household head fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by government 
health insurance, an indicator for whether any household member is covered by private health insurance, and an indicator for whether the household has a BPL 
card. The geographic controls include state level population density (in log) and three place of residence fixed effects. Health facility controls include hospital 














Table F2: Confidence in Institutions: Alternative Measures of Sterilization 
 
 





 Confidence: Private 
hospitals and doctors 
 (1) (2) 
   
   
Excess Male Sterilization (Vasectomy) 0.0297*** -0.0159 
 (0.00846) (0.00992) 
   
Household Controls YES YES 
Geographic Controls YES YES 
Health Facility Controls YES YES 
Observations 40,562 40,549 
Mean of dependent variable 1.577 1.308 
Notes: Data are from India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II), 2011-12. The Unit 
of observation is a household. The household controls include household size, income, ten 
source of main income fixed effects, eight religion fixed effects, five caste fixed effects, 
two wealth class fixed effects (poor, middle class, (comfortable as reference group)), 16 
education of the household head fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household 
member is covered by government health insurance, an indicator for whether any 
household member is covered by private health insurance, and an indicator for whether 
the household has a BPL card. The geographic controls include state level population 
density (in log) and three place of residence fixed effects. Health facility controls include 
hospital per 1000 population and doctors per 1000 population at the state level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
